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Based on a True Story: The Ever-Expanding
Progeny of Rogers v. Grimaldi
Zachary Shufro*
Quid fuerim quid simque vide meritumque require.**
Trademark law limits the extent and manner to which individuals can use a surprisingly large percentage of common words in the
English language. Indeed, as one empirical study of trademark registrations revealed, “when we use our language, nearly three-quarters of the time we are using a word that someone has claimed as a
trademark.” Because trademark law grants a negative right to the
mark-holder—that is to say, a right to prevent others from using that
trademarked word in certain manners and contexts—it inherently
conflicts with the First Amendment. In assessing the resulting discord from such a conflict, courts have several measures to determine the metes and bounds of the First Amendment’s priority over
trademark law. In the case of an expressive or artistic work which
uses the trademark of another (or the name of an individual), one
such test that has developed is the Rogers test, named for a 1989
lawsuit involving the actress and dancer Ginger Rogers. Over the
past thirty years, this test has outgrown the relatively narrow confines in which it was originally envisioned by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, and particularly in the Ninth Circuit, its progeny
has taken on a life of its own. This Article examines the most recent
*
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“What I was, what I am, see, and seek the justice therein.” OVID, METAMORPHOSES
II.551.
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development in the ever-expanding ambit of the Rogers test: the
Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. As one Ninth Circuit panel stated in a recent
opinion, “[i]t is said that bad facts make bad law”;1 however, VIP
Products proves that the inverse can also be true, and that bad legal
analysis can defeat a strong factual scenario. The implications of
this decision in future cases remains unclear, but this Article considers the pernicious consequences of an even-broader application
of the Rogers test in the Ninth Circuit moving forward.
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INTRODUCTION
Trademark law limits the extent and manner to which individuals can use a surprisingly large percentage of common words in the
English language. Indeed, as one empirical study of trademark

1

In re Walldesign, Inc., 872 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2017).
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registrations revealed, “when we use our language, nearly threequarters of the time we are using a word that someone has claimed
as a trademark.”2 Because trademark law grants a negative right to
the mark-holder—that is to say, a right to prevent others from using
that trademarked word in certain manners and contexts—it inherently conflicts with the First Amendment. In assessing the resulting
discord from such a conflict, courts have several measures to determine the metes and bounds of the First Amendment’s priority over
trademark law. In the case of an expressive or artistic work which
uses the trademark of another (or the name of an individual), one
such test that has developed is the Rogers test, named for a 1989
lawsuit involving the actress and dancer Ginger Rogers.3 Over the
past thirty years, this test has outgrown the relatively narrow confines in which it was originally envisioned by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, and particularly in the Ninth Circuit, its progeny
has taken on a life of its own.
This Article examines the most recent development in the everexpanding ambit of the Rogers test: the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc.4 This
Article proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the policy goals
and purposes of trademark law, provides a brief overview of the
Lanham Act’s false endorsement right of action and of trademark
dilution, and synopsizes both Rogers v. Grimaldi and the development of the Rogers test in the Ninth Circuit. Part II then analyzes the
VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. district court
and appellate decisions, and considers the consequences of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit not only stretched
the purpose of the Rogers test to a breaking point, but also improperly relied upon the test’s basic premise as grounds to incorrectly
dispose of a trademark dilution claim—despite the different standards, purposes, and policy goals of trademark infringement and
trademark dilution statutes. The consequences of such precedent going forward are still unclear.
2

Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An
Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 982
(2018).
3
See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989).
4
953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1054 (2021).
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Part III concludes by considering how to remedy the ever-increasing scope of the Rogers test in Ninth Circuit jurisprudence and
reflects on the potential effects that VIP Products could have on future trademark false endorsement claims. As one Ninth Circuit panel
stated in a recent opinion, “[i]t is said that bad facts make bad law”;5
however, VIP Products proves that the inverse can also be true, and
that bad legal analysis can defeat a strong factual scenario. The implications of this decision in future cases remains unclear, but this
Article considers the pernicious consequences of an even-broader
application of the Rogers test in the Ninth Circuit moving forward.
I. TRADEMARK LAW OVERVIEW
A trademark is a word, name, or design used by an individual or
company in commerce to identify the source from which their goods
or services emanate.6 While important exceptions to trademark
rights exist in order to balance the First Amendment interests of individuals other than the mark-holder—one such exception being that
which was evaluated under the Rogers test7—as a general matter,
the holder of a trademark is entitled to the sole nationwide use of
that mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services
identified in the trademark registration.8 This Part provides a short
overview of the purposes and policy goals of trademark law, and
then examines how the Rogers test first arose in 1989 and how it has
evolved in Ninth Circuit jurisprudence.

5

In re Walldesign, Inc., 872 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2017).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her
goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown”). See also Zachary Shufro, Haute Couture’s Paper
Shield: The Madrid Protocol and the Absence of International Trademark Enforcement
Mechanisms, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 645, 649 (2020).
7
See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192,
1196 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying the Rogers test to determine whether the use of a trademark
in the title of an expressive work constituted trademark infringement).
8
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
6
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A. The Purpose of Trademark Law
Trademark law is rooted in unfair competition law, with the aim
of protecting the public from commercial fraud.9 In its modern incarnation, it serves the important twin goals of protecting both the
public and the trademark owner.10 The use of a distinctive trademark
in commerce “ensures [that] the public can clearly identify a source
of goods.”11 In this manner—as a source identifier—trademarks
protect the public in two different ways. First, trademarks protect
consumers from fraud and deception by ensuring that consumers can
rely upon the quality of products produced by brands they trust.12
Second, and relatedly, trademarks reduce consumer search costs because they allow consumers to develop expectations of cost and
quality for products.13 For example, a frantic new mother may insist
on buying Pampers diapers without examining other options available, because she knows that they are high-quality, safe, and trustworthy. A trademark serves its owner in two similar fashions. First,
trademarks encourage the production of quality goods and services
because they allow owners to invest in their brands without fear that
others will benefit from their success.14 This incentivizes businesses
to maintain high quality standards for their products.15 Second,
trademarks encourage fair competition (while protecting brand owners from unfair competition, misappropriation, and infringement)

9

See, e.g., Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65
TRADEMARK REP. 265, 287–88 (1975) (citing Singleton v. Bolton, (1783) 99 Eng. Rep. 661,
3 Doug 293 (KB) (Eng.)) (“The beginning of legal protection for trademarks as such
generally is traced to a 1783 dictum in an English case, stating that an action for damages
would lie based upon fraud.”).
10
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987).
11
Ashlyn Calhoun, “It All Started with a Mouse”: Resolving International Trademark
Disputes Using Arbitration, 2018 J. DISP. RESOL. 87, 88 (2018).
12
See, e.g., Mathias Strasser, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited:
Putting the Dilution Doctrine Into Context, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
375, 380 (2000).
13
See id. (“[T]rademarks reduce the search costs of consumers.”); see also Landes &
Posner, supra note 10, at 270 (“The value of a trademark is the saving in search costs.”).
14
See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 270 (“[A] firm with a valuable
trademark would be reluctant to lower the quality of its brand because it would suffer a
capital loss on its investment in the trademark.”).
15
See id.
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because companies are incentivized to distinguish their products
from one another.16
1. False Endorsement
Beyond prohibiting simple infringement and counterfeiting,
trademark law prohibits a variety of actions which threaten the very
brand goodwill that businesses and consumers rely upon in commerce. One such prohibition is false endorsement. Under 15 U.S.C.
Section 1125, trademark infringement liability extends to any individual who uses a trademark in commerce that is likely “to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of [that] person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.”17 Generally “a person’s image or likeness cannot function as a
trademark,”18 but in some circumstances, a celebrity, famous company, or other well-known individual’s name or likeness can function as an indicator of source subject to a false endorsement claim
in which “the ‘mark’ at issue is the plaintiff’s identity.”19 Much like
a claim for passing off—the common law antecedent of federal
trademark law’s prohibition on deceptive marks20—false endorsement claims prevent one producer from deceiving the public as to
the relationship between its good and another individual or producer.21

16

See id. (“[Trademarks] are valuable because they denote consistent quality, and a firm
has an incentive to develop a trademark only if it is able to maintain consistent quality.”).
17
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
18
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922, 937 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the sale of works of art depicting golfer Tiger Woods did not give rise to a Lanham Act
false endorsement claim).
19
Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing White
v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399–400 (9th Cir. 1992)).
20
See, e.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924)
(finding a valid claim for unfair competition and fraud when one pharmaceutical company
sold the less expensive product Quin-Coco to drug stores while the pharmacists could sell
that product to consumers as the more expensive product Coco-Quinine).
21
Cf., e.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1399–400.
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2. Trademark Dilution
Trademark dilution is a cause of action that approximates the
dignitary harms of tort law in the context of unfair competition.22 As
first articulated by Frank Schechter in 1927, dilution is an “interference with the uniqueness of a mark, which [is] the key to its selling
power.”23 Economic rationales for trademark dilution range from
concern about increased consumer search costs,24 to potential postsale or secondary-market confusion,25 to inchoate harms, to the status-signifying quality of well-known trademarks.26 However, unlike
other forms of trademark infringement, dilution “imposes liability
without any requirement of confusion.”27 Whether the diluting use
of a trademark tarnishes the public perception of the well-known
mark28 or merely blurs the purchasing public’s association with the

22

See generally Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).
23
Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science,
86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 517 (2008). For a discussion of the basis of Schechter’s theory in a
German court’s 1924 misappropriation case, see generally Barton Beebe, The Suppressed
Misappropriation Origins of Trademark Antidilution Law: The Landgericht Elberfeld’s
Odol Opinion and Frank Schechter’s “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,” in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014).
24
See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 306–07 (“Suppose a lounge in Boston calls
itself ‘Tiffany’s’ or a peanut vendor in the Bowery calls himself ‘Rolls-Royce Ltd.’ . . .
hereafter when the consumer sees the name ‘Rolls-Royce,’ he will think both about the
auto manufacturer and about the peanut vendor, and the connotations of the name will
blur.”).
25
See id. at 308 (“[T]he confusion does not occur in the market for the trademarked
good, or in any other product market, but in a ‘resale’ market where consumers of the
product compete with other consumers for advantageous personal transactions.”).
26
See id. (“Just as people conceal their undesirable characteristics in order to create or
protect such capital, so they . . . advertise themselves . . . by wearing clothes, jewelry, or
accessories that tell the world that they are people of refined (or flamboyant) taste or high
income. If others can buy and wear cheap copies, the ‘signal’ given out by the purchasers
of the originals is blurred.”).
27
Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road,
24 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 473 (2008).
28
Dilution by tarnishment occurs when an “association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark” occurs in such a manner as to “harm[]
the reputation of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). See also Sarah L. Burstein,
Dilution by Tarnishment: The New Cause of Action, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1189, 1191
(2008) (“[T]arnishment occurs when a defendant uses the same or similar marks in a way
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mark,29 the harm that dilution seeks to prevent “is a form of cognitive obstruction—that is, that . . . consumers must ‘think for a moment’ whenever they see one of the marks to determine to which
company the mark refers.”30 Confirmed in 2003 by the United States
Supreme Court, dilution seeks to ensure that “the preservation of the
uniqueness of a trademark . . . constitute[s] the only rational basis
for its protection.”31 It is a distinct form of liability from trademark
infringement, with its own elements to be proven in litigation and
independent affirmative defenses.32
B. Rogers v. Grimaldi
In 1986, famous Italian film-maker Federico Fellini33 produced
the film Ginger and Fred, distributed throughout the United States
and Europe.34 The film recounts a fictional story about two Italian
cabaret performers known as Ginger and Fred, for their impersonations of Hollywood stars Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.35 Critics
described the work as a “bittersweet story of these two fictional

that creates an undesirable, unwholesome, or unsavory mental association with the
plaintiff’s mark.”) (internal quotations omitted).
29
Dilution by blurring consists of an “association arising from the similarity between a
mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous
mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
30
Barton Beebe et al., The Science of Proving Trademark Dilution, 109 TRADEMARK
REP. 955, 956 (2019) (quoting Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 67, 75 (1992)).
31
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) (quoting Frank I.
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 831
(1927)).
32
See, e.g., Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the
Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1830 (2000) (“[T]he
dilution doctrine is commonly misunderstood by courts, laboring under the impression that
dilution is a consequence of infringement, and that confusion must therefore be found in
order to sustain a dilution claim.”).
33
Fellini is known for his earlier films, including the 1960 Academy Award-winner La
Dolce Vita. See Anthony Lane, A Hundred Years of Fellini, New Yorker (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/01/27/a-hundred-years-of-fellini
[https://perma.cc/XFH4-9C78].
34
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d. Cir. 1989).
35
Id. at 996–97. Rogers and Astaire “are among the most famous duos in show business
history,” and the Second Circuit noted that they number “among that small elite of the
entertainment world whose identities are readily called to mind by just their first names,
particularly the pairing ‘Ginger and Fred.’” Id. at 996.
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dancers and . . . a satire of contemporary television variety
shows.”36 It “received mixed reviews” before Ginger Rogers sought
to permanently enjoin the movie’s distribution in the United States
by filing suit against the producers, alleging a Lanham Act false endorsement claim and a right of publicity claim.37
Rogers produced survey evidence38 indicating that the movie title misled viewers to believe Rogers was connected to the film.39
However, the Southern District of New York dismissed her claims
“because the speech at issue . . . [was] not primarily intended to
serve a commercial purpose, the prohibitions of the Lanham Act
[did] not apply, and the Film [was] entitled to the full scope of protection under the First Amendment.”40 Noting that while a “[p]oetic
license is not without limits,” the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, as “[m]ovies, plays, books, and songs are all
indisputably works of artistic expression and deserve protection.”41
The court thereby struck a balance between the free expression concerns within the First Amendment and the Lanham Act’s protection
of an individual or company’s right to prevent false sponsorship,
endorsement, or affiliation with the services or goods of another.
This balancing act has since become known as the Rogers test.
1. The Rogers Test
In assessing Ginger Roger’s false endorsement and right of publicity claims, the Second Circuit noted that “[t]hough First Amendment concerns do not insulate titles of artistic works from all Lanham Act claims, such concerns must nonetheless inform [a court’s]
consideration of the scope of the Act.”42 This is because “[t]itles,

36

Id. at 997.
Id.
38
Survey evidence is often an integral aspect of trademark litigation and can be a
deciding factor in determining whether a mark is distinctive, generic, or is likely to confuse
or mislead consumers. See Barton Beebe et al., The Role of Consumer Uncertainty in
Trademark Law: An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation 3–6 (N.Y. Univ. L. &
Econ. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 21-13, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3854730 [https://perma.cc/437B-TLV5].
39
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
40
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 120–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
41
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
42
Id. at 998.
37
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like the artistic works they identify, are of a hybrid nature, combining artistic expression and commercial promotion.”43 Taking pains
to narrowly construe the Lanham Act,44 the court held the following:
In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity’s
name, [the] balance will normally not support application of the Act
unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly
misleads as to the source or the content of the work.45
While this test does not always favor creators’ First Amendment
rights over mark-holders’ Lanham Act claims,46 the Second Circuit
reasoned that the test accurately balances these conflicting interests
because “most consumers are well aware that they cannot judge a
book solely by its title any more than by its cover.”47 Insofar as Fellini’s film was concerned, the court held that Rogers’s claims were
precluded by the First Amendment, because “[t]o the extent that
there [was] a risk that the title [would] mislead some consumers as
to what the work [was] about, that risk [was] outweighed by the danger that suppressing an artistically relevant though ambiguous title
[would] unduly restrict expression.”48 By producing Ginger and
Fred, Fellini not only won the 1986 National Board of Review’s
Best Foreign Film award and enjoyed some additional minor commercial success, but also secured a place in trademark law’s history.49 In sum, through the story about two washed-up former entertainers, a legal star was born.

43

Id.
See id. at 999 (“[I]n general the Act should be construed to apply to artistic works
only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression.”).
45
Id.
46
See id. (“Even where a title surpassed the appropriately low threshold of minimal
artistic relevance but was explicitly misleading as to source or content, a violation could
be found.”); see also id. at 1000.
47
Id. at 1000.
48
Id. at 1001.
49
See 1986 Award Winners, NAT’L BD. REV., https://nationalboardofreview.org/awardyears/1986/ [https://perma.cc/P2Y6-5E7U].
44
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2. Rogers in the Ninth Circuit
Merely thirteen years after the Second Circuit decided Rogers v.
Grimaldi, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Rogers test in its 2002 decision, Mattel v. MCA Records, Inc.50 Affirming the Central District
of California’s ruling that the Danish music group Aqua’s song
“Barbie Girl” was “not likely to confuse consumers as to Mattel’s
affiliation with [the song] or dilute the Barbie mark,”51 the Ninth
Circuit “agree[d] with the Second Circuit’s analysis and adopt[ed]
the Rogers standard” for assessing the balance of First Amendment
and trademark rights in an expressive or artistic work.52 Given the
scant evidence of consumer association between the song “Barbie
Girl” and Mattel, the Ninth Circuit unsurprisingly affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of MCA Records
and Aqua.53 Nevertheless, the court’s equally scant Rogers test analysis foreshadowed the extremely permissive view of Rogers to come
in Ninth Circuit jurisprudence.54 Later decisions extended the applicability of the Rogers test from song and movie titles,55 to the
titles of artistic works such as photographs,56 to a video game that
used a company’s trade dress and confusingly similar logo.57

50

See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Recs., Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 899.
52
Id. at 902.
53
See id. (“The only indication that Mattel might be associated with the song is the use
of Barbie in the title; if this were enough to satisfy this prong of the Rogers test, it would
render Rogers a nullity.”).
54
See id. (applying the Rogers test to the facts of the dispute in a short, conclusory
manner and in a sole paragraph).
55
See id.
56
See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Forsythe’s use of the Barbie mark is clearly relevant to his work . . . .The Barbie mark in
the titles of Forsythe’s works and on his website accurately describe the subject of the
photographs, which in turn, depict Barbie and target the doll with Forsythe’s parodic
message.”) (citations omitted).
57
See E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding that because a video game is an artistic work and because the accurate
depiction of a real-life neighborhood—including the trade dress and logo of a strip club
based in that neighborhood—”is relevant” to the video game designers’ “artistic goal,
which is to develop a cartoon-style parody of East Los Angeles,” the designer’s decision
“to include a strip club that is similar in look and feel to the [plaintiff’s business] does
indeed have at least ‘some artistic relevance.’” (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994,
999 (2d Cir. 1989))).
51
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Within a decade after the Ninth Circuit adopted the Rogers test,
however, its focus shifted from only considering the artistic relevance of a work’s title or content to considering the overall relevance of the trademark or individual’s identity implicated in such an
analysis.58 For example, in Brown v. Electronic Arts, a celebrity
football player introduced evidence that the vast majority of the consuming public believed an athlete’s inclusion in a video game required permission or at least affiliation with the product.59 This evidence implicated the second prong of the Rogers test: whether “the
[use of the trademark or identity] explicitly misleads as to the source
or the content of the work.”60 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit sided
against the athlete whose image was used in the video game, and
found that “the likeness of a great NFL player is artistically relevant
to a video game that aims to recreate NFL games.”61 Unlike Rogers,
where using Ginger Rogers’s name and identity was integral to the
film’s artistic message,62 the (somewhat obfuscated)63 identity of
one retired football player was likely not essential to the artistic goal
of “extreme realism” in a video game.64
A few years after Brown, the Ninth Circuit further muddied the
waters of the Rogers test in Twentieth Century Fox Television v.
Empire Distribution, Inc., when it failed to distinguish between the
expressive use of a trademark in a creative work (a television show)
and the use of that same mark to identify the source of a commercial
enterprise (the name of a record label brand).65 In this case, Empire

58

See, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1242–47 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
that even though the sole “artistic relevance” of including a celebrity football player’s
likeness in a video game was the desire for “extreme realism,” and even though “a majority
of the public believes that identifying marks” such as a football player’s name and likeness
“cannot be included in products without permission,” his inclusion in the video game did
not explicitly mislead consumers as to his endorsement or sponsorship of the video game).
59
See id. at 1245–46.
60
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
61
Brown, 724 F.3d at 1248.
62
See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
63
The video game designers “changed the jersey number” worn by Brown, for example,
and otherwise “scramble[ed]” his avatar’s identity in the end commercial product. Brown,
724 F.3d at 1246–47.
64
Id. at 1243.
65
See Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1199
(9th Cir. 2017).
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Distribution—a record label founded in 2010—sued Twentieth Century Fox Television (“Fox”) after the television company began to
sell music related to its 2015 show, Empire, under the “Empire”
brand.66 In its decision, the court elided over the distinction between
Fox’s use of the Empire mark in the title of its television show—a
use, under the Rogers test, that is equally protectable as Ginger Rogers’s name in Fred and Ginger.67 The Ninth Circuit similarly ignored Fox’s use of the Empire mark as a source-identifier on the
commercial products it sold—which, coincidently, were the same
type of goods as those sold under the Empire mark by Empire Distribution.68 Despite clear, factual distinctions between Empire and
Rogers, the Ninth Circuit found that Fox’s all-but-usurpation of Empire Distribution’s trademark was protected expressive use under the
Rogers test.69
II. VIP PRODUCTS LLC V. JACK DANIEL’S PROPERTIES, INC.
The Ninth Circuit’s expansive view of the Rogers test reached
its latest apogee in a case involving Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc.
(“Jack Daniel’s”), a Delaware-based holding company that owns the
intellectual property of the Jack Daniel’s Whiskey Distillery based
in Lynchburg, Tennessee.70 Founded in 1866 by Jasper Newton
Daniel with the help of the company’s newly-emancipated head distiller, Nathan Green, Jack Daniel’s was the first registered distillery
in the United States and has been making whiskey for over 150
years.71 With a unique mellowness and consistency resulting from

66

See id. at 1195.
Compare id. at 1197–99 (noting that Fox used the Empire mark in connection with its
television show, an artistic and expressive work), with Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994,
997 (2d Cir. 1989) (referring to “[m]ovies, plays, books, and songs” as “works of artistic
expression” which “deserve protection” under the First Amendment).
68
See Twentieth Century Fox Television, 875 F.3d at 1195–98.
69
See id. at 1198–99.
70
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc. v. VIP Prods., LLC,
141 S. Ct. 1054 (2020) (No. 20-365).
71
See Born to Make Whiskey: The Story of Jack Daniel’s, JACK DANIEL’S,
https://www.jackdaniels.com/en-us/our-story [https://perma.cc/UJW6-VS75] [hereinafter
Born to Make Whiskey].
67
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an exact distillation process,72 Jack Daniel’s distinguished itself
from competitors in the pre- and post-Prohibition eras.73 After a
1951 Fortune article “chronicled its growth and appeal to such disparate figures” as William Faulkner, Winston Churchill, and John
Huston, Jack Daniel’s profile was truly on the rise.74
Artificial scarcity through the 1970s and unsolicited promotion
by Frank Sinatra and Paul Newman helped create a status-signifying
brand with nationwide recognition.75 After expanding its distillery
and ending its exclusive allocation distribution system, the company
“grew into a global brand, almost tripling sales from 1973 to 1986”
and introducing its “iconic black-and-white label on the equally
iconic square bottle” to the wider world.76 The brand maintains a
trademark registration “for the three-dimensional configuration of a
square shape bottle container . . . for distilled spirits,”77 with four
key design elements78 that accompany the source-identifying words,
“Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey,” “Old No. 7,” and “Jack
72

See Jim Stengel, Jack Daniel’s Secret: The History of the World’s Most Famous
Whiskey, ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2012/01/jack-daniels-secret-the-history-of-the-worlds-most-famous-whiskey/250966/
[https://perma.cc/U6YC-8XW3]. This process involved only using “iron-free cave spring
water” and “the finest grains,” a mellowing process achieved by filtering the whiskey
“through ten feet of sugar maple charcoal,” and constantly changing the charcoal used. Id.
It is likely that this process, like Jasper Daniel’s knowledge of distilling whiskey in general,
is the legacy of Nathan Green, the former slave who taught him how to make whiskey, as
it is “likely that the practice evolved from slave distilling traditions, in which charcoal
helped remove some of the sting from illicitly made alcohol.” Clay Risen, Jack Daniel’s
Embraces a Hidden Ingredient: Help From a Slave, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/dining/jack-daniels-whiskey-nearis-greenslave.html [https://perma.cc/VQ5G-YWC3].
73
See Born to Make Whiskey, supra note 71.
74
See Stengel, supra note 72.
75
See id. (“[P]opular culture continued to associate it with maverick independence . . . .
Nelson Eddy says, ‘When Hollywood scriptwriters want to use short-hand to show that a
character is somebody to reckon with, they still put Jack Daniel’s in their hands.’”). From
1964 to 1987, the company underwent a “transformation from a little known regional
whiskey to an American icon as synonymous with rock and roll as the electric guitar.” Born
to Make Whiskey, supra note 72.
76
Stengel, supra note 72.
77
VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., No. CV-14-2057-PHX-DGC, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64736, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2015).
78
These elements are “(1) a square bottle with a ribbed neck; (2) a black cap; (3) a black
neck wrap closure with white printing; and (4) a black front label with white printing.” Id.
at *7.
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Daniel’s.”79 The company registered this trade dress in 201280 and
has since attained incontestable status.81
Plaintiff, VIP Products, LLC (“VIP”), is an Arizona-based company that “designs, manufactures, markets, and sells chew toys for
dogs,” including the “Silly Squeakers” line of durable rubber
squeaky novelty toys.82 In July 2013, VIP released its “Bad Spaniels” novelty dog toy, which “is in the shape of a liquor bottle and
features a wide-eyed spaniel over the words ‘Bad Spaniels, the Old.
No. 2, on your Tennessee Carpet.’”83 Beyond the phonetic similarity
between the Bad Spaniels toy and the bottle design for Jack Daniel’s
whiskey, the products share a variety of visual and textual characteristics, including “the shape of the product, the use of white lettering over a black background, and font styles.”84
On the packaging for the dog toy, a disclaimer stated that VIP’s
product was “not affiliated with Jack Daniel’s.”85 Nevertheless, Jack
Daniel’s “promptly demanded that VIP stop selling the new toy.”86
VIP responded by filing a lawsuit in Arizona district court seeking
a declaratory judgment for non-infringement and seeking to invalidate Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress registrations on the basis that the claimed marks are functional, “merely ornamental and
decorative,” generic, and non-distinctive.87 Jack Daniel’s filed a
79

Id. at *9. See JACK DANIEL JACK DANIEL, Registration No. 4,106,178 (“The
mark consists of the three-dimensional configuration of the square shaped bottle container
for the goods, having an embossed ridge or scalloped design on the neck portion of the
bottle, and an embossed signature design comprised of the words ‘JACK DANIEL.’”).
80
See JACK DANIEL JACK DANIEL, Registration No. 4,106,178.
81
In American trademark law, a mark registered on the USPTO’s Principal Register that
has been in continuous use for five years, and for which there has been no challenge by a
third party, can be considered “incontestable” and is thereafter immune from legal
challenge to its facial validity. 15 U.S.C. § 1065. See also Park’N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly,
469 U.S. 189, 191 (1985) (where a mark had become incontestable, another party could
not challenge the mark as descriptive); Casper W. Ooms & George E. Frost,
Incontestability, 14 L. & Contemp. Probs. 220 (1949).
82
VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., No. CV-14-2057-PHX-SMM, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133387, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2016).
83
Id. at *3.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at *3–4. See also Complaint at 4, VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc.,
No. CV-14-2057-PHX-DGC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64736 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2015) (No.
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variety of counterclaims, alleging trademark and trade dress infringement, dilution by tarnishment, and state law allegations of
trademark infringement and unfair competition.88
A. District Court Decision
Both parties moved for summary judgment in district court.89
VIP contended that Jack Daniel’s “infringement and dilution claims
[must] be denied because the defenses of nominative and First
Amendment fair use shield it from liability.”90 Further, VIP claimed
that Jack Daniel’s could not prove its dilution claims under the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”) and that Jack Daniel’s
trademark and trade dress registrations were not entitled to protection.91
Jack Daniel’s left “for trial the issue of whether VIP’s alleged
parody infring[ed] or dilut[ed] the Jack Daniel’s trademarks and
trade dress,” but asserted that its trademark and trade dress were distinctive and should not be subjected to a cancellation proceeding.92
The court denied VIP’s motion and granted Jack Daniel’s partial
summary judgment, issuing a detailed Memorandum and Order on
the merits of all three of VIP’s claims and the related counterclaims
by Jack Daniel’s.93

CV–14–02057–PHX–DGC), ECF No. 1 (seeking a declaratory judgment); Amended
Complaint at 11, VIP Prods., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133387 (No. CV-14-2057-PHXSMM), ECF No. 49 (seeking a declaratory judgment and cancellation of Jack Daniel’s PTO
registration).
88
See VIP Prods., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133387, at *4–6; see also Answer and
Counterclaims of Defendant and Counterclaimant Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. at 4, VIP
Prods., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64736 (No. CV–14–02057–PHX–DGC), ECF No. 12.
89
See Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 1, VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 291 F.
Supp. 3d 891 (D. Ariz. 2018) (No. CV–14–02057–PHX–SMM), ECF No. 101 (Jack
Daniel’s motion for summary judgment on VIP’s cancellation claim and declaratory action
seeking to find the Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress functional and/or nondistinctive); Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claims for Relief and
Memorandum in Support at 1, VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 291 F. Supp.
3d 891 (D. Ariz. 2018) (No. CV–14–02057–PHX–SMM), ECF No. 110.
90
VIP Prods., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133387, at *5–6.
91
Id.
92
Id. at *6.
93
See id. at *2.
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Inter alia, the court found that that VIP was unable to claim
nominative fair use as a defense, as it did not use any of Jack Daniel’s marks, “including the Jack Daniel’s name; the number 7; the
embossed Jack Daniel’s signature on the bottle; the same filigree
design on the label; the three-sided body label, or the identical combination of elements constituting the trade dress.”94 Turning to
VIP’s argument that the Bad Spaniels toy was an expressive work
entitled to protection under the First Amendment, the court noted
that “the Rogers standard applies to artistic or expressive works.”95
Thus, it found the Bad Spaniels toy was not an expressive work entitled to First Amendment protection.96 Correctly applying the Rogers test to the Bad Spaniels toy, the court distinguished between “the
standard trademark likelihood of confusion analysis”—where a parody defense is applicable to VIP’s products—and the category of
“artistic expression” to which the Rogers test was meant to apply.97
Noting the parallels between VIP’s Bad Spaniels toy and another
parodic dog toy lawsuit,98 the court held that “because the adaption
of the Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress [were] being used, at
least in part, to promote a somewhat non-expressive, commercial
product, the First Amendment [did] not extend to such use.”99
The district court then granted Jack Daniel’s partial summary
judgment based on the finding that Jack Daniel’s “bottle dress is a
source identifier for Jack Daniel’s whiskey,”100 and that Jack Daniel’s “has established direct evidence of secondary meaning.”101

94

Id. at *12–13.
Id. at *14–15.
96
Id.
97
Id. at *15.
98
See id. at *16 (referencing Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221
F. Supp. 2d 410, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (litigation over Nature Lab, LLC’s “Timmy
Holedigger” alleged parody dog perfume, which copied the Tommy Hilfiger trademarks)).
99
VIP Prods., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133387, at *16.
100 Id. at *19.
101
Id. at *22. In trademark law, secondary meaning “means proof that the consuming
public understands the word or phrase to name the brand[]” in instances where such a word
or phrase is not inherently distinctive. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 290. The
existence of secondary meaning is often determined by survey evidence. See Beebe et al.,
supra note 38, at 3–6. It permits a company or individual to appropriate an otherwise
undistinctive or descriptive word, phrase, color, shape, or trade dress as a trademark when
such a mark is understood by the consuming public to denote a specific source of origin
95
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Turning to Jack Daniel’s trademark dilution counterclaim, the court
found that the language of the TDRA102 and relevant precedent from
the Fourth Circuit103 “compel[led] the result that the fair use defense
[was] not available to VIP and its alleged parody product.”104 This
was because VIP used the “Bad Spaniels trademark and trade dress
as source identifiers of its dog toy, which [took] its alleged parody
product outside the fair use defense under the TDRA.”105 The court
first determined that under Section 1125(c)(2)(A) of the TDRA, “it
is undisputed that the sales, advertising, and public exposure of Jack
Daniel’s whiskey packaged in the Jack Daniel’s trade dress provide[d] substantial indirect evidence of fame.”106 The court emphasized that “under the TDRA, a party only must show ‘similarity,’
not substantial similarity or nearly identical [use], between the famous mark and the accused mark,” and ruled that “a reasonable trier
of fact could find that the VIP product and Jack Daniel’s trade dress
[met] the requisite similarity standard for dilution.”107 Thus, the
court denied VIP’s motion for summary judgment on Jack Daniel’s
counterclaims, and preserved for trial “the issue of whether VIP’s
alleged parody infringe[d] or dilute[d] the Jack Daniel’s trademarks
and trade dress.”108
After the parties’ summary judgment motions were resolved, the
court held a four-day bench trial in October 2017.109 At the end of
the trial, Judge McNamee found in favor of Jack Daniel’s on all remaining claims.110 Integral to this conclusion were the findings that
“VIP’s intent behind designing the ‘Bad Spaniels’ toy was to match
the bottle design for Jack Daniel’s Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey
(‘Old No. 7 Brand’)” and the “design elements include[d] the size
for the goods or services offered thereunder. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 288–
90.
102 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
103 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 266 (4th
Cir. 2007).
104 VIP Prods., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133387, at *36.
105
Id.
106 Id. at *39.
107
Id. at *48–49.
108 Id. at *6.
109 VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 291 F. Supp. 3d 891, 897 (D. Ariz.
2018).
110 Id.
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and shape of the product, the use of white lettering over a black
background, and font styles.”111 Initial marketing materials for the
Bad Spaniels toys included “the ‘Bad Spaniels’ product appear[ing]
in a bar setting alongside various hanging bottles, one of which can
be recognized as a Jack Daniel’s bottle.”112 Given the similarity between the products and VIP’s concession “that it used Jack Daniel’s
trademarks and trade dress as a model for its ‘Bad Spaniels’ dog
toy,” the court found similarity between the products under the
TDRA.113
At trial, Dr. Simonson—the expert for Jack Daniel’s—introduced testimony “that the ‘Bad Spaniels’ product is likely to tarnish
the Jack Daniel’s trademarks and trade dress by creative negative
associations, either consciously or unconsciously, and undermining
the pre-existing positive associations with its whiskey.”114 Given the
nature of Jack Daniel’s products—goods intended for human consumption—and the scatological nature of the negative association
created by VIP’s dog toy,115 the district court found that Jack Daniel’s established all elements for a dilution by tarnishment claim.116
Turning to Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress infringement
claims, the court credited the testimony of survey expert witness Dr.
Gerald Ford that “over [twenty-nine percent] of those . . . who had
been shown the ‘Bad Spaniels’ product . . . identified Jack Daniel’s
[sic] as [the producer] who had made, sponsored, or approved the
product pictured.”117 In the same survey, “almost none of those in
the control [group]—who had been shown [a] fictitious dog toy—
identified Jack Daniel’s in response to [the same] questions” of approval or sponsorship.118 The court weighed evidence of the survey
results (which showed a likelihood of consumer confusion “nearly
double the threshold to show infringement”),119 the “undisputed”

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 898.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 903.
See id. at 904–05.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 907.
Id.
Id. at 908.
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nature of VIP’s intent to copy the Jack Daniel’s trademarks and trade
dress,120 and the inapplicability of a parody defense since it was
clear that VIP “sought to capitalize on Jack Daniel’s popularity and
good will for its own gain.”121 It ultimately found a likelihood of
consumer confusion, and thus trademark and trade dress infringement under federal and state law.122 The district court’s opinion was,
in short, a total victory for Jack Daniel’s.
B. Ninth Circuit Decision
VIP appealed to the Ninth Circuit.123 In its March 31, 2020 decision, the appellate panel reversed, vacated, and remanded the district court’s judgment on Jack Daniel’s trademark infringement and
dilution claims.124 Ignoring the survey and expert evidence on Jack
Daniel’s dilution claim, the court found that the “light-hearted, dogrelated alterations” to the Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress
were protected under the Rogers test.125 Judge Hurwitz wrote that
it served VIP’s goal to create a toy line that reflected on “the humanization of the dog in our lives,” and commented on “corporations
[that] take themselves very seriously.”126 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision rejecting “VIP’s request for cancellation
of the registered mark” on the basis that it is distinctive and nonfunctional.127 The court also affirmed the district court’s rejection
of VIP’s nominative fair use defense.128 However, in finding that the
Rogers test applied to a parodic toy like VIP’s Bad Spaniels product,
the court incorrectly expanded the Rogers test’s application well beyond the limits of the test’s purpose.129
Internal Ninth Circuit guidance documents direct judges addressing trademark disputes to Twentieth Century Fox Television v.
120

Id.
Id.
122
Id. at 911.
123 See Notice of Oral Argument on Friday, February 7, 2020, VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack
Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-16012), ECF No. 50.
124 See VIP Prods., 953 F.3d at 1172.
125
Id.
126 Id. (internal quotations omitted)
127 Id. at 1174.
128 Id.
129 Id.
121
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Empire Distribution, Inc.130 This case provides guidance as to
whether the Rogers test is a legal question decided de novo when
determining whether the title of an expressive work violates the Lanham Act.131 While the district court correctly noted that a parody
defense under a normal likelihood of confusion analysis was the
proper means of assessing VIP’s claimed First Amendment defense
to Jack Daniel’s trademark infringement claim,132 the panel instead
held the Rogers test applies to any artistic expression.133 It further
noted that the Lanham Act only applies to such works if the plaintiff
can establish at least one of the two requirements under the Rogers
test.134 This framework would preclude any application of trademark law in allegations involving “expressive” content except in the
most limited circumstances where the use of a trademark is “not artistically relevant” or “explicitly misleads consumers.”135 Under this
flawed framework, the Ninth Circuit confused parody and the Rogers test in its analysis.136
The panel’s apparent rationale for excusing VIP’s alleged infringement of Jack Daniel’s was that the Bad Spaniels toys were
“expressive works” that “communicate[d] a ‘humorous message,’ . . . using word play to alter” the Jack Daniel’s trademarks.137
Accordingly, Judge Hurwitz found the dog toys protected under the
Rogers test.138 However, his analysis follows the contours of parody
rather than those of the Rogers test. Similar to Gordon v. Drape

130

875 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2017). See also supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
This language is pulled from the standard of review and overview of legal issues
guidelines distributed to Ninth Circuit judges and their chambers as a part of training
provided by the Administrative Offices of the United States Courts, as updated in January
2019. See STANDARDS OF REVIEW OUTLINE § III.C.27.ee. (9th Cir. 2017). Cf. Twentieth
Century Fox Television, 875 F.3d at 1196.
132 See VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 291 F. Supp. 3d 891, 908 (D. Ariz.
2018); VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., No. CV-14-2057-PHX-SMM, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133387, at *15 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2016).
133 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2020).
134
Id.
135 Id. (quoting Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 265 (9th Cir. 2018)).
136
Id.
137 Id. at 1175.
138 See id. (“A work need not be the ‘expressive equal of Anna Karenina or Citizen Kane’
to satisfy this requirement.” (quoting Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1241 (9th
Cir. 2013))).
131
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Creative, Inc.,139 where the Ninth Circuit found the juxtaposition of
a sardonic image and slogan with a greeting card marking “an event
of some significan[ce]” created a “humorous message” resulting in
First Amendment protection,140 Judge Hurwitz stated that though
the Bad Spaniels toys were “surely not the equivalent of the Mona
Lisa,” they were nevertheless expressive works.141
Rather than provide a traditional Rogers analysis,—examining
whether, despite the expressive nature of the work, the use of a
trademark was either “not artistically relevant” or “explicitly misleads consumers”142—Judge Hurwitz explained that the Bad Spaniels toys created “‘a simple’ message conveyed by ‘juxtaposing the
irreverent representation of the trademark with the idealized image
created by the mark’s owner.’”143 This analysis perfectly mirrors the
definition of a parody—articulated by the Fourth Circuit in one example as “a simple form of entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing
the irreverent representation of the trademark with the idealized image created by the mark’s owner.”144 In short, the panel purported to
apply one defense to trademark infringement—the Rogers test—
while, in reality, applied a substantively different defense—that of
parody.145
Underscoring the extent to which the panel mislabeled a parody
analysis as an application of the Rogers test, Judge Hurwitz emphasized the similarity between VIP’s Bad Spaniels toy and the dog toys
at issue in the Fourth Circuit’s case, Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v.
Haute Diggity Dog, LLC.146 In this case, dog toys bearing Louis
Vuitton’s trademarks and named “Chewy Vuiton” were found to be

139

909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 268–69.
141 VIP Prods., 953 F.3d at 1175.
142 See, e.g., Gordon, 909 F.3d at 265.
143
VIP Prods., 953 F.3d at 1175 (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811
F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987)).
144
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir.
2001) (quoting L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 34).
145
See VIP Prods., 953 F.3d at 1175 (“Bad Spaniels comments humorously on” Jack
Daniel’s trademarks, and “[t]he fact that VIP chose to convey this humorous message
through a dog toy is irrelevant.”) (internal citations omitted).
146 See id. (“The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute
Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007), supports our conclusion.”).
140
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a parody of the Louis Vuitton brand and its consumers.147 Judge
Hurwitz relied on the parodic nature of the Bad Spaniels toy to claim
that VIP was entitled to protection under the Rogers test: “[b]ecause
Bad Spaniels is an expressive work,”—apparently equating the parodic humor of the toys with an artistic message—he explained that
“the district court erred in finding trademark infringement without
first requiring [Jack Daniel’s] to satisfy at least one of the two Rogers prongs.”148
Ignoring the circular logic underpinning this conclusion (a parody is expressive and therefore protected not under the test for parody, but under Rogers), Judge Hurwitz was also factually and legally incorrect that the district court failed to show Jack Daniel’s
satisfied either prong of the Rogers test.149 The second prong asks
whether the expressive work “explicitly misleads [consumers] as to
the source or the content of the work.”150 At the district court level,
Senior Judge McNamee explicitly made a finding of fact to that effect: he credited Dr. Ford’s survey evidence showing a twenty-nine
percent likelihood of consumer confusion, and acknowledged that
this clearly surpassed the threshold to show confusion.151 It is hard
to imagine clearer evidence that VIP’s use of the Jack Daniel’s
trademarks and trade dress “explicitly misle[d] [consumers] as to the
source or the content of the work,”152 as required to satisfy at least
one of the Rogers prongs.153 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision suffered fundamental logical flaws in its trademark infringement analysis.
The Ninth Circuit summarily reversed Jack Daniel’s trademark
dilution claim due to the rationale that, under Rogers, the Bad Spaniels toys were protected expressions.154 Judge Hurwitz noted that not
all speech employed when promoting and selling a product is strictly
147

Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir.
2007).
148 VIP Prods., 953 F.3d at 1175–76.
149
See id.
150 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
151
VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 291 F. Supp. 3d 891, 907 (D. Ariz.
2018).
152 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
153 VIP Prods., 953 F.3d at 1177–78.
154 See id. at 1176.
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commercial, and that some uses of a mark can be “noncommercial”
if they “‘do[] more than propose a commercial transaction,’ . . . and
contain[] some ‘protected expression.’”155 While Judge Hurwitz
correctly noted that “use of a mark may be ‘noncommercial’ even if
used to ‘sell’ a product,”156 and that “noncommercial” use of a mark
is normally precluded from liability for dilution by tarnishment,157
the TDRA is more nuanced than depicted. Rather, the TDRA provides an affirmative defense to a dilution by tarnishment claim for
“[a]ny fair use . . . other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with . . .
parodying.”158 Again, the district court’s reasoning followed the
confines of the law more closely than the Ninth Circuit. Judge
McNamee explicitly found that VIP used the “Bad Spaniels trademark and trade dress as source identifiers of its dog toy, which [took]
its alleged parody product outside the fair use defense under the
TDRA.”159
Judge Hurwitz and the rest of the Ninth Circuit panel were apparently convinced by the supposedly all-encompassing First
Amendment protection afforded to VIP through the “humorous message” conveyed by its Bad Spaniels toy.160 Nevertheless, as the
Fourth Circuit explained in Louis Vuitton, a parody is protected only
insofar as it “undoubtedly and deliberately conjures up the [targeted
trademarks] and trade dress, but at the same time, it communicates
that it is not the [parodied] product.”161 Only an imperfect copy can
“evoke a humorous, satirical association that distinguishes the products.”162

155

Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Comput. Corp.,
378 F.3d 1002, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Recs., Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906
(9th Cir. 2002)).
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Id. (quoting Nissan Motor, 378 F.3d at 1017).
157 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C)).
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15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
159 VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., No. CV-14-2057-PHX-SMM, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133387, at *36 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2016).
160 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2020).
161 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir.
2007).
162 Id. at 263.
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Unlike Louis Vuitton, where there was no evidence of actual
confusion,163 VIP could not claim that consumers would immediately comprehend the “two simultaneous—and contradictory—messages” of parody: “that it is the original, but also that it is not the
original and is instead a parody.”164 Rather, as over twenty-nine percent of potential consumers experienced actual confusion as to the
connection between the Bad Spaniels dog toys and Jack Daniel’s,
the dog toys could, at best, be considered an unsuccessful parody,
neutralizing the parodic First Amendment defense under the
TDRA.165 In sum, by allegedly applying the Rogers test in its analysis of the parodic effect of VIP’s products, the Ninth Circuit fundamentally undercut its ability to properly assess the district court’s
analysis. By claiming that the humorous nature of the Bad Spaniels
toy was fundamentally protected by the First Amendment, the Ninth
Circuit not only incorrectly expanded the scope of the Rogers test,
but also created a holding whose impact remains to be felt.166
C. Aftermath
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion, Jack Daniel’s
filed a petition for rehearing, stating:
Rehearing or rehearing en banc is necessary because
the Panel opinion vacating and reversing [the district
court’s] findings applie[d] a framework precluded by
the trademark nature of VIP’s imitations and
adopt[ed] a definition of expressive work unsupported by the Court’s own jurisprudence . . . thus
producing an exception that swallows the traditional
rules governing trademark infringement.167
Noting that no other circuits apply the Rogers test to parodic or
otherwise minimally expressive uses of a trademark “for good
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Id.
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir.
2001).
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See VIP Prods., LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 291 F. Supp. 3d 891, 907 (D. Ariz.
2018).
166 See VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020)
167 Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1, VIP
Prods., 953 F.3d 1170 (No. 18-16012), ECF No. 63.
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reason,” Jack Daniel’s argued that the panel’s “unnecessary constitutionalization of routine trademark disputes” was not only legally
incorrect, but also “significantly restrict[ed] trademark owners’ ability to protect consumers against the likely confusion” between
goods in such cases.168
The International Trademark Association (“INTA”) filed an
amicus brief in support of the rehearing petition, emphasizing the
unprecedented application of the Rogers test to parodic uses of a
mark and to noncommercial speech under the TDRA.169 Seven
trademark law professors led by Stanford Law School’s Mark Lemley and Harvard Law School’s Rebecca Tushnet, filed the brief in
opposition to Jack Daniel’s petition for rehearing.170 However, the
professors noted that the most proper means by which the Ninth Circuit should have reached its eventual conclusion “would have been
to find as a matter of law that VIP’s parody product [was] not likely
to cause confusion.”171 Accordingly, their argument was premised
on the convenience of a court applying the Rogers test to a parody
for reasons of judicial economy and cost-saving by litigants.172
However, in this case—where both parties already committed significant resources to the suit and a four-day bench trial occurred by
the time of judgment—such considerations amount to little more
than a wish-list of cost-saving measures unaffected by the case itself.173
Despite strong arguments in favor of rehearing—which would
unlikely have changed the outcome, but would have provided the
panel an opportunity to draft a new opinion reaching the same conclusion on Jack Daniel’s claims through application of the parody
test—the panel denied rehearing and no judge on the Ninth Circuit
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Id. at 3–4.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Trademark Association in Support of
Appellee at 8–10, VIP Prods. LLC., 953 F.3d 1170 (No. 18-16012).
170
Brief of Amici Curiae Trademark Law Professors in Opposition to Motion for
Rehearing En Banc, VIP Prods., 953 F.3d 1170 (No. 18-16012).
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See id. at 3 (emphasis added).
172 See id at 3–4. The latter half of the amici’s brief focused on the (likely)
unconstitutionality of dilution by tarnishment—an issue beyond this scope of this paper—
on which the amici are quite possibly correct. See id. at 6–15.
173 Cf. supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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requested rehearing en banc.174 Jack Daniel’s filed a petition for certiorari at the United States Supreme Court in September 2020,175
with the renewed support of INTA176 and an additional five amici.177
Three trademark law professors filed an amicus brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari—though of the original seven amici
at the Ninth Circuit, only two remained involved in the case.178
Again, despite Jack Daniel’s emphasis on the inflexibility of the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling on appeal and the increased burden it places
on trademark owners in protecting their brands,179 the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in January 2021.180 Therefore, despite its status as an “egregiously wrong” application of the test181 resulting in
an “outlier decision,” the Ninth Circuit’s extremely broad application of the Rogers test remains the most recent controlling authority
in the Ninth Circuit on the intersection of trademark law and the
First Amendment.182
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See Order at 1, VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., No. 18-16012 (9th Cir.
June 3, 2020), ECF No. 72 (denying rehearing and rehearing en banc).
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc. v. VIP Prods. LLC, 141 S.
Ct. 1054 (2021) (No. 20-365).
176 See Brief for International Trademark Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, VIP Prods., 141 S. Ct. 1054 (No. 20-365) [hereinafter Brief of the International
Trademark Association].
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See Brief of Amicus Curiae Alcohol Beverage Industry Associations Supporting
Petitioner, VIP Prods., 141 S. Ct. 1054 (No. 20-365); Brief for the Intellectual Property
Law Association of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, VIP Prods., 141 S.
Ct. 1054 (No. 20-365); Brief for Campari America LLC as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, VIP Prods., 141 S. Ct. 1054 (No. 20-365); Brief for Campbell Soup Co. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, VIP Prods., 141 S. Ct. 1054 (No. 20-365); Brief for
Constellation Brands, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, VIP Prods., 141 S. Ct.
1054 (No. 20-365); Brief for Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, VIP Prods., 141 S. Ct. 1054 (No. 20-365).
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See Brief of Amici Curiae Trademark Law Professors in Opposition to Petition for
Certiorari, VIP Prods., 141 S. Ct. 1054 (No. 20-365) [hereinafter Brief of Trademark Law
Professors]. Compare supra, with Brief of the International Trademark Association, supra
note 176.
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See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 2, VIP Prods., 141 S. Ct. 1054 (No. 20-365).
180 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1054 (2021).
181 Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 179.
182 Id. at 2 (alteration in original).

418

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:391

III. CONCLUSION: A BRIDGE TOO FAR? RE-ASSESSING THE ROGERS
TEST
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in VIP Products is merely the latest
in a line of cases taking an exceptionally broad view of expressive
or artistic works.183 While its ratio decidendi follows the expanded
scope of the Rogers test adopted in previous decisions, the panel’s
opinion went further than past panels dared to tread. Historically,
the Ninth Circuit remained at least marginally faithful to the spirit
of the initial Rogers decision, which was calibrated to “accommodate[] consumer and artistic interests”184 by applying to “[t]itles,
[and] the artistic works they identify,” which “are of a hybrid nature,
combining artistic expression and commercial promotion,”185 and
thus implicate the First Amendment due to their artistic and expressive nature. Past decisions focused on balancing First Amendment
rights and the Lanham Act with regard to the titles and content of
modern art, satirical song lyrics, or the visual décor of a video
game’s fictionalized setting.186 In contrast, in VIP Products, the
Ninth Circuit applied the Rogers test to a parody whose artistic value
was minimal at best.187 By expanding the scope of the Rogers test to
the point of subsuming another well-recognized trademark defense—parody—the panel potentially stretched this line of cases to
the breaking point. Comparing this approach to how the Second Circuit (originator of the Rogers test) concurrently limited its scope,
this Part considers means of restricting the Rogers test to cases in
line with its original purpose. It then concludes by examining the
problems VIP Products will likely create in future Ninth Circuit
trademark decisions.
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See supra Part I.B.2.
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989).
185 Id. at 998.
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See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Recs., Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899–902 (9th Cir. 2002)
(applying the Rogers test to a song’s lyrics and title); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the Rogers test to the name and subject
of highly expressive photographic works of modern art); E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock
Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099–101 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the Rogers test to
the name of a store depicted in the artistic context of a video game).
187 See VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2020).
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A. The Restrictive Rogers Test
The Second Circuit is the font from which the Rogers test sprang
forth ex nihilo, to assess a right of publicity claim framed as a Lanham Act violation.188 Despite the Second Circuit’s role as the progenitor of this test, whose interpretation elsewhere has ballooned to
encompass greeting cards189 and dog toys as “artistic” works,190 the
in-circuit progeny of Rogers pale in comparison to their West Coast
brethren.
The Second Circuit began narrowing its Rogers holding merely
140 days after the opinion was issued in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.191 (and more than a decade
before the Ninth Circuit adopted the Rogers test in Mattel, Inc. v.
MCA Records, Inc.).192 The case involved a parody of the Cliffs
Notes study guides, and the Second Circuit distinguished the factual
premise upon which Rogers was decided.193 Unlike Rogers, which
addressed a work’s title as false advertising, in Cliffs Notes, the Second Circuit asked “whether the appearance of a work’s cover is confusingly similar to the trademark elements of an earlier cover,” with
“the added element of parody.”194 While the court acknowledged
that “the expressive element of parodies requires more protection
than the labeling of ordinary commercial products,” it ultimately applied a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis weighing First
Amendment interests of parody against “the strong public interest in
avoiding consumer confusion.”195 The Second Circuit explained that
the Rogers test was relevant in instances where “expression, and not
commercial exploitation of another’s trademark, is the primary intent.”196 Just as a customer shopping for a book, a movie, or “a can
of peas” is entitled to know the source of the product and not be
misled,197 the court relied on traditional parody analysis in finding
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Cf. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998.
Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 260 (9th Cir. 2018).
See VIP Prods., 953 F.3d at 1174–76.
886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Recs., Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
Cliff Notes, 886 F.2d at 495.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 495.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997–98 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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the works at issue in Cliffs Notes were unlikely to cause consumer
confusion, constituting protected speech.198
The applicability of the Rogers test was further narrowed the
following year at the district court level in Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v.
Leisure Time Products, B.V.199 This case involved a dispute over an
independent film company’s right to use the name “River Kwai” in
the title of its film, notwithstanding a third party’s trademark rights
in the celebrated movie, Bridge on the River Kwai.200 While sharing
a number of factual similarities with Rogers—the name in dispute
was a film title and neither term (“River Kwai” nor “Rogers”) would
be registrable on its own as a trademark201—the Southern District of
New York expressly rejected the applicability of Rogers.202 The
court reasoned that Rogers “only applies to situations where a celebrity’s name is used in a title.”203
While the Southern District’s view of Rogers as articulated in
Tri-Star Pictures was never explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit, their application of the Rogers test three years later in Twin
Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd.204 undercut the Southern District’s hard-line approach. The dispute in Twin
Peaks Productions centered around a book based on the television
show Twin Peaks.205 In assessing whether the use of the show’s
name in the book title infringed the trademark, the Second Circuit
noted that “[a]lthough Rogers arose in the context of a title using a
celebrity’s name, we have applied it to the literary title ‘Cliffs
Notes,’ a literary title apparently not containing the name of a real
person, and certainly not of a celebrity.”206
198

See id. at 496–97.
749 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
200 See id. at 1245; see also T
HE BRIDGE ON THE RIVER KWAI (Horizon Pictures &
Columbia Pictures 1957).
201 Rogers would have been unable to register her surname as a trademark due to its
nature as a term which “is primarily merely a surname,” whereas the phrase “River Kwai”
refers to a river in Thailand, and is used in the titles of both films in a manner that “is
primarily geographically descriptive.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2)–(4).
202 Tri-Star Pictures, 749 F. Supp. at 1253.
203
Id.
204 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
205 See id. at 1370.
206 Id. at 1379 (citing Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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Nevertheless, the court maintained the limited breadth of the defense created by the Rogers test. It noted that in order to survive an
allegation of trademark infringement under the test, an artistically
relevant use of a trademark must be assessed for likelihood to mislead the public through a likelihood of confusion analysis.207 The
Second Circuit further recognized that even in such circumstances,
“[i]t is a fair question whether a title that might otherwise be permissible under Rogers violates the Lanham Act when displayed in a
manner that conjures up a visual image prominently associated with
the work bearing the mark that was copied.”208 Thus, the Second
Circuit reduced the hitherto seemingly-powerful Rogers test to the
status of a preliminary step in a traditional likelihood of confusion
test, placing a thumb on the scale in favor of First Amendment protection without wholly overwhelming the balance in its favor.
Two recent cases in the Second Circuit demonstrate the narrowness with which the Rogers test applies under this line of cases. In
2019, another dispute arose in the Southern District of New York
involving “multiple parties asserting multiple claims to the intellectual property rights of Marilyn Monroe.”209 The court rejected a
Rogers defense to the use of Marilyn Monroe’s image on a t-shirt
claimed to be “an expressive medium.”210 The court explained that
“the Rogers test is usually not the appropriate mechanism for examining an ordinary commercial product.”211 Even assuming arguendo
that t-shirts are sufficiently expressive to qualify as artistic works
for which a Rogers defense could be raised, the court found that
consumer confusion about whether Marilyn Monroe’s estate endorsed or authorized these products undermined any application of
Rogers.212 This is because a consumer “has a right not to be misled
as to the source of the product.”213 Similarly, in Cousteau Society,
Inc. v. Cousteau,214 the district court rejected a Rogers defense in a
207

Id.
Id. at 1380.
209
A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Estate of Marilyn Monroe, LLC, 364 F. Supp. 3d 291, 299
(S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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Id. at 322.
211 Id. at 321–22.
212 See id. at 322.
213 Id. (internal citation omitted).
214 498 F. Supp. 3d 287 (D. Conn. 2020).
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dispute over the plaintiff’s use of the defendant’s grandfather’s
name and likeness in a documentary, because it was not a case
“where simply looking at [the] underlying work itself, and the context in which it appear[ed], demonstrate[d] how implausible it [was]
that a viewer [would] be misled into believing that the plaintiff endorsed the defendant’s work.”215
B. Assessing the Consequences of VIP Products
The Second Circuit’s more restrictive view of the Rogers test is
a tonic to the over-expansive progeny of Rogers in the Ninth Circuit;
the Second Circuit views the likelihood of confusion analysis as being integrated into the second prong of the test and allows evidence
of a strong likelihood of confusion (or actual confusion) to overcome strong First Amendment interests in expressive speech.216 In
VIP Products, the Ninth Circuit found that a “humorous message”
in the parodic design of a dog toy was protected under the Rogers
test.217 This was interpreted as an all-but-absolute bar on claims under the Lanham Act, despite survey evidence showing that over
twenty-nine percent of potential consumers experienced actual confusion as to the connection between the Bad Spaniels dog toys and
Jack Daniel’s.218 However, in the Second Circuit, it is highly likely
that such strong evidence of actual consumer confusion would defeat a Rogers defense.219 While a strong constitutional interest in
protecting expressive speech like parody still exists, the First
Amendment is not an absolute bar to trademark infringement where
a mark’s use substantially confuses consumers as to the source of
goods. Were the Ninth Circuit to temper its application of the Rogers
test in such a manner, the worst effects of VIP Products could be
largely mitigated.
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Compare, e.g., Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d
Cir. 1993), with VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1174–76
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Beyond the application of VIP Products to trademark infringement claims, a troubling precedent now exists in which a trademark
dilution claim involving another’s mark as branding for an infringing product, was disposed of under Rogers’ artistic expression theory.220 As noted above, the plain language of the TDRA provides an
affirmative defense to a claim of dilution by tarnishment for “[a]ny
fair use . . . other than as a designation of source for the person’s
own goods or services, including use in connection with . . . parodying.”221 At the district court level, Judge McNamee explicitly found
that VIP used the “Bad Spaniels trademark and trade dress as source
identifiers of its dog toy, which [took] its alleged parody product
outside the fair use defense under the TDRA.”222 Therefore, Jack
Daniel’s prevailed on their dilution claim.223 The Ninth Circuit reversed this determination,—without order for a remand and instead
finding for VIP on the basis of its “humorous message”224—upsetting the already-unbalanced First Amendment considerations implicated in the TDRA.
While there is a compelling argument that the dilution by tarnishment doctrine is unconstitutional under the First Amendment,225
the analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit in VIP Products does
nothing to correct such underlying constitutional conflict. Rather
than resolving this conflict, the VIP Products panel substituted the
traditional analysis for determining noncommercial speech, instead
replacing it with the nebulous bar of humor or parody.226 As noted
in INTA’s amicus brief supporting Jack Daniel’s petition for certiorari, this analysis “improperly shortcuts the analysis of whether a
use is ‘commercial,’” further eroding an appropriate balance between free speech and trademark interests.227 Given the district
court’s uncontroverted finding that VIP clearly intended “to
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capitalize on Jack Daniel’s popularity and good will for its own
gain”228 by using the Bad Spaniels trademark and trade dress as
source identifiers of its dog toy,229 it is hard to square this analysis
with the plain language of the TDRA. Short of an upcoming Ninth
Circuit case explicitly disavowing this approach, the precedential
value of VIP Products creates a scenario in which courts will cite to
VIP Products and to Rogers as grounds to incorrectly dispose of a
claim for trademark dilution, despite the different standards, purposes, and policy goals of trademark infringement and trademark
dilution statutes.
As a whole, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in VIP Products is distinguished by its overly expansive view of the Rogers test and its
misunderstanding of the fragile balance between First Amendment
and trademark dilution law. As the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, there is little to no chance of correcting the faulty decision
itself. Were the Ninth Circuit to reform its understanding of Rogers
to conform with the restricted application in the Second Circuit, perhaps some of the more pernicious consequences of VIP Products
could be avoided. Nevertheless, without the panel’s decision sua
sponte to issue an amended opinion, the consequences of this case
will likely be widespread in Ninth Circuit jurisprudence and will
significantly curtail the trademark rights of mark holders for years
to come.
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